Camp Cromwell

Tuesday, June 18, 2019

The Shenandoah Valley

At Resica we left Sherman to march south on Atlanta & headed east. It took us 4 days with 3 nights camping in the woods to cross the Appallacians to the eastern theatre of the war. Suddenly every became very close together & today we visited 8 battlefields between Waynesboro & Winchester while travelling only 148 miles. Some were small & unremarkable, but they still added to the vibe of the valley. The richness of the valley is obvious. The valley floor is rolling country with a mix of woods & open fields. It is impossible to know exactly how the present day woods correspond to the time of the war. Some there then would have been cleared since. Some areas now wooded, had been cleared for charcoal. But the general character seems to still correspond with the descriptions one reads - a mix of open ground & woods with rolling hills - generally much more open than out west. As we fought an 1862 campaign at Camp Cromwell early last year it all seemed very familiar.

Cross Keys & Fort Republic 1862
These were the last two battles of jackson's 1862 campaign, close together, they were fought on successive days. Early on the left of the Reb's position faced Fremont at Cross keys while Jackson on the right faced Shields.

Meanwhile at Fort Republic Fremont had a sound position with a river on his right & hills making a great artillery platform on left. Jackson, madly chose to attack. The attack predictably failed & the Feds pursued the beaten Rebs across the fields. But Ewell had showed up from Cross Keys & been sent to the Rebs right. He attacked the pursuers in flank & turned defeat into victory.

Jackson retired, having done his job of distracting 3 Union Corps from the main game near Richmond.

New Market 1864

In 1864 Grant sent Sigel down the valley to deny it's resources to the Confederacy. Brekinridge, was defending the valley, but was heavily outnumbered. The battle had little tactical manoeuvre or interesting terrain. The most unique feature of the battle was the CSA's desperate use of cadets from a military academy to fill out their ranks - with predictably tragic results.

Fishers Hill 1864
After Early's raid north to try & distract Union troops from Richmond, Grant sent Sheridan to drive him out of the valley. Early had set up a defensive line at Fishers Hill just south of Strasburg. His right rested on the North Fork of the Shenadoah, but his left on Fisher's hill did not extend to the mountains on his left as he lacked enough men to do so.

This is the Union view of the end of Early's line.

Sheridan moved a division to the right across his rear out of sight of the Rebs to push through the woods on the Reb's left & outflank them.

The woods on the Reb flank look pretty thick now, but were very possibly more open then. But the description above indicates that the veteran troops were not fazed by the disorder caused. They burst out onto the Reb's flank & the end f the Reb line broke. Early tried to cobble together a new line of defence, but it didn't happen & the Rebs were beat.

Cedar Creek 1864
After Fishers Hill Sheridan consolidated his hold on the lower valley. The Union were convinced that Early was spent force & over-relaxed in their camp at Cedar Creek several miles north of Fisher Hill. But Early rhad received reinforcements & launched a surprise dawn attack. The Union units at the very front were routed, but others held their ground for a while & bought time. Sheridan was away from the front the morning of the attack, but galloped down the road to join his men leaving a line of officers to round up stragglers. The Rebs advanced about 5km before Sheridan had cobbled together a sound defensive line. Early paused the attack, momentum was lost & the Rebs had to fall back. It was the same old story as Shiloh & Murfreesboro, the Rebs surprised the Union, thought they'd won, declared victory, then the Union rally & they Rebs end up losers.

The main Union campground abandoned as the Rebs attacked form the left.

Kernstown 1862 & 1864
The Kerntown battlefield is privately owned & only open at weekends. It was Monday, so we missed out on these two.

Moving South with Sherman

Just SE of Chickamauga, at Ringgold there is a narrow gap in a steep wooded ridge running N-S that the all-important railway ran through. After Chattanooga, the Rebs retreated through the gap leaving a rear guard. Grant had sent Hooker in pursuit of the beaten Rebs, but they left a rear guard at the pass which stopped the pursuit & allowed the Reb army to get away with its artillery & baggage. The Union army regrouped at Chattanooga prepared for a new offensive in the spring.

In May 1864 Sherman began his march on Atlanta. A few miles southeast of Ringgold, there was another gap in another steep wooded N-S ridge called Rocky Face. The Rebs now had Johnson in command & about 54,000 men which he deployed to block the pass with substantial earthworks in the pass & along the ridge with the north end curved back to protect his flank. Sherman had about 74,000 men. He ordered attacks at various points, but soon confirmed that the position was too strong. He had already sent McPherson South to cut off Johnson’s line of retreat but Johnson realised what was happening & retired south. Casualties were less than 1,000 each.

The gaps are difficult to photograph being heavily wooded gaps between heavily wooded ridges with a road & a railway passing through.

The Resica position was almost a repeat of Ringgold & Rocky Face, except this time the gap was between the end of a ridge & the substantial Oustanaula River. The gap was defended by Fort Wayne & 4,000 Rebs. McPherson had 4 times as many, but declined to attack the strong defences, so Johnson was able to bring his army south & draw up his now reinforced army in another good defensive position. Once again Sherman attacked at various points along the line looking for weak points & not finding any. But at the same time his engineers were building a bridge over the Oustanaula. Once again Johnson twigged what Sherman was up to & withdrew his army intact. 110,000 Union troops were in the area v. 60,000 Rebs, but casualties were less than 3,000 each. Neither of these Generals wanted to have their armies mangled in slogging matches.

The terrain is a mix of open plain & wooded ridges.

But in 1864 the woods had largely been cleared.

Much of the battlefield is is reserved & well marked with interpretive signs.

The Oustanaula is a substantial barrier.

Fort Wayne was a substantial work & though parts of it remain it's difficult to get good photos through the scrub (which of course had been cleared away in 1864).

Monday, June 17, 2019

The Chattanooga Campaign

While Grant was taking Vicksburg, Rosecrans advanced on Chattanooga, Tennessee, another vital point in the Confederacy’s communication. He out-manoeuvred Bragg, forcing Bragg to abandon Chattanooga without a battle. But Bragg was reinforced with Longstreet’s Division from the east & attacked Rosecrans at Chickamauga a few miles south of Chattanooga.

The initial battle lines ran north-south each side of the Chickamauga Creek. On day 1 Bragg concentrated his attack on the Union left trying to cut the Feds off from Chattanooga but failed to break through.

On Day 2 had some indecisive fighting along the line. Overnight the Union fortified while the Rebs received reinforcements.

On Day 3, the Rebs again attacked the Union left. It held, but one of Rosecrans orders to reinforce it was misinterpreted & a gap was left just south of the Union centre. At just the right time Longstreet’s division happened to attack that very spot & his men poured through the gap. The Union right retreated in disorder taking Rosecrans with it. Thomas, the ranking General left on the field, cobbled together a defence on Snodgrass Hill behind the Union centre. He eventually had to retire, but he gained enough time for the Union army to retreat to Chattanooga in reasonable shape & he became the Rock of Chickamauga in the Union press.

Bragg followed up, but declined to attack the fortified town. When Bragg held Chattanooga & Rosecrans took Lookout Mountain, Bragg decided he had to withdraw. Now that positions were reversed he assumed that the Feds would think the same as he did. So he declined to attack the fortifications he’d had built & laid siege.

But Grant removed Rosecrans & put the Rock of Chickamauga in charge & he was made of sterner stuff. He hung on grimly despite the difficulty of getting supply past the Confederate guns on Lookout Mountain until Grant arrived. Grant immediately found a way to open a better supply line able to supply not only Thomas, but reinforcements as he prepared to break the siege.

Grant sent Hooker west, to cross the Tennessee River on a pontoon bridge & attack Lookout Mountain from the west. The Union soldiers had to scrabble up an extremely steep slope & avoid cliff lines. But shielded by fog & the impossibility of the guns on top being able to fire down at them because of the slope, they easily drove the outnumbered defenders from the top. Hooker then had to get his men over the mountain & down into the valley to support the attack on Missionary Ridge, not an easy task.

On the east side of Chattanooga Grant sent Sherman over another pontoon bridge to attack the west end of Missionary Ridge. The terrain turned out to be rougher than expected & included a hidden ravine. As a result Sherman’s advance was also slower than expected.

In the centre Thomas’ division faced the seemingly impregnable Missionary Ridge position. Grant ordered them to take the rifle pits at the foot of the Ridge & they did that easily. But they didn’t stop there. Still smarting from their defeat at Chickamauga two months before they were after revenge. They charged off up the hill in hot pursuit of the Reb’s forlorn hope. With the Reb’s fire inhibited by their one retreating men and the steepness of the slope Thomas’ men were unstoppable & carried their works in one charge. Grant’s flanking attacks, though stalled, had dragged all the reserves off to the flanks & the Confederates had no choice but to retreat.

There is a large visitor’s centre at Chickamauga with a good doco & exhibits & a smaller one on Lookout Mountain. You can get the driving guide at either.

The Chattanooga battlefield is largely built over, but the terrain features are so strong it doesn’t matter much. That Lookout Mountain was so named is no surprise. The view is tremendous. It dominates the western approach to Chattanooga & provides a great view of Missionary Ridge on the other side of the valley of Chattanooga Creek. We drove right along the crest line of Missionary Ridge, but the views were difficult to get because of the houses & trees. The slopes are heavily wooded now, even the parts built over have the houses among trees, but in 1863 the photos show they were largely denuded then. So while it would have been hard going in rough ground uphill, over most of the battlefield there was probably little cover for attackers. The ground at Sherman’s end was very steep, broken & heavily wooded & from the descriptions of Sherman’s difficulties that seems to also have been the case in 1863. The battlefield is very different from all the others we have visited. Not only is it unique in have seriously steep hills that really stand out as geographic features but it’s huge. Missionary Ridge alone is about 12 km long & there were separate actions on Lookout Mountain & the northern end.

The Chickamauga Battlefield, like Shiloh, has been largely preserved in its original state. It is also a similar size & similar in character – mainly woods with patches of cleared land. (As is Murfreesboro).

An added bit of interest was added by my e-pal Jeff Berry who writes the Obscure Battle Blog. His Great Great Grandfather was there & was captured on Snodgrass Hill when his regiment, the 89^th Ohio didn’t get the order to retreat & was captured. We found the monument to the 89^th Ohio on Snodgrass Hill. Jeff’s GGGF escaped from the POW camp & rejoined the army in time take part in Sherman’s advance to Atlanta. He was later wounded, but survived the war with a limp.