Campaign Umpire:
Peter Williams (in Canberra by
email).
Battlefield Umpire:
Mark
Oakford.
French Players:
Mike
Nash (Chief of Staff)
Chris
Arthur
Nick
Bowler
Peter
Collidge
Prussian Players:
Jim
Gandy (Chief of Staff)
Steve
Jendrich
James
Fyfe
Barrie
Macdonald
Byron
Combes
Apart from the Chiefs of Staff, the players were
not allocated specific commands.
The
players on each side would act as a team devising strategy with the Chief of Staff
acting as coordinator and in charge of communications with the umpire.
Battles to be fought by whoever turned up on
the night.
As the campaign progressed,
the Chiefs of Staff on both sides morphed into Commanders in Chief.
The Set-Up
Historically, the Prussian army had started an
advance on the French and their army was scattered over the countryside when
they discovered that Napoleon had mobilised faster than they thought possible
and was coming towards them in great strength.
The campaign started with the Prussian’s 11 all
arms divisions totalling about 145,000 men scattered across the theatre of
war (their ID# are shown on the map at the start).
They had intel that the French were
advancing into the Thuringerwald with an army of about 175,000 men in 8 Corps.
The King of Prussia has insisted to his Staff that the
army must not show weakness and cannot retreat behind the Sommerda-Jena-Gera
line.
2 of the divisions (8 & 9) are unwilling
Saxon Allies.
The possession of Leipzig
is important, not only counting in the victory conditions, but also the Saxon
troops will desert if Leipzig falls to the French.
The French have a big numerical advantage in
infantry and their troops are more experienced.
The Prussians have better cavalry than the French, but it is spread out
among the divisions, not concentrated in one Corps like the French.
They have much more artillery than the
French, but half of it is small pieces distributed to the infantry where it
partly makes up for the skill difference.
The French army & leaders have better
command ratings than the Prussians.
Initial Prussian Strategy
The Prussian staff had a vigorous debate before
settling on a plan.
The adopted plan was
to concentrate in two armies:
Army East
around Schlieux 0910 & Army West at Rudolstadt 0610.
The plan
offered a prospect of catching a French Corps isolated as it emerged from the
Thuringerwald to provide a battle that would convince the King that his staff
knew what they were doing and lift his arbitrary ban on a retreat north of
Jena-Gera.
Days 1 & 2
The concentration of Army West was always going to
take some time, but some divisions had reached Rudolstadt by the end of day 2.
Army East was much less scattered and quickly
consolidated and rested behind a heavy screen of hussars waiting for intel from
the cavalry & spies.
The intel told us that there were French in
strength at Saalfled 0712 in the centre, approaching Schlieux 0910 from the
south and pushing down the Hof-Plauen-Gera road in the east.
Day 3
In the west, the concentration of Army West
continued.
The speed of the French advance in the east told
us that the French were working under different forced march rules than we
had.
There was clearly a need for action
to prevent Army East being outflanked.
Again
there was argument in the Prussian staff over alternative plans 1) to retreat
west and join Army West near Jena. Or 2) Attack the French advance guard at
Gera before Le Grande Armee could intervene.
The army moved en-masse towards Gera hoping to smash the French advance
guard before the main French army, believed to be south of Schliex, could
intervene.
The result was the battle of
Gera.
In this battle, better French command and dice got
them into Gera before us, but by the end of the day Soult’s Corps was all but
surrounded in Gera and beat a precipitous retreat over the river to the north.
Meanwhile, a delaying action at Polnitz
prevented the French main army joining Soult.
Day 4
Soult’s retreat from Gera & the gallant rear
guard action at Polnitz was enough to convince the King of the seriousness of
the situation and lift his embargo on retreat north of the Jena-Gera line.
The Prussians had two choices the next day:
1) To continue the battle chasing after Soult while holding Napoleon off, or:
2) Break off to the west, cross the Saale to join Army West.
Brunswick decided on the safer option 2), thinking
that Soult would simply slip away to the east anyway and the junction of the
two Prussian armies would be considerably delayed if Army West headed north.
Day 5
The Prussians completed a safe crossing of the
Saale.
The gallant Saxon 8
th
division, heroes of Polnitz were sacrificed in a delaying action at Jena &
the two Prussians wings were finally together.
Day 6
As the Prusssians continued their move north on
the west side of the Saale, they discovered that the French were attacking
Leipzig in strength.
Only part of the
French army had followed them west, Soult and Bernadotte launched an assault on
the badly maintained medieval walls.
Outnumbered 4:1 the garrison comprising 5,000 Prussians & 5,000
unwilling Saxon militia put up a fight for a while, but once a breach was made it
was soon overwhelmed.
The loss of
Leipzig meant that the remaining Saxons deserted the Prussian cause and the
French gained a victory condition.
Days 7 & 8
The Prussian army recrossed the Saale at Mersberg
& Halle.
With Leizig lost their
main hope of gaining some kind of victory was to get the army to the Elbe
intact to join the Russians who are supposed to be on their way.
There was again dissention in the Prussian
camp with two plans on the table: 1) Move to Magdeburg. 2) Move to Bittefeld
& thence to either Dessau or Torgau.
Brunswick chose 2), even though it was more risky, as the further west
the crossed the Elbe, the better the spin was to make the movement a strategic
move rather than a retreat.
Brunswick
fully expected the march on Bittefeld might run into a French army moving west
from Leipzig, but considered that enough French were in the west to make this
an acceptable risk.
As it happened no
French were encountered near Bittefeld.
Day 9
Brunswick turned right at Bittefeld to make for
Torgau and the Russians.
Between
Bittefed & Eilenburg the Prussians finally found the French marching out of
Leipzig towards Bittefeld.
It was soon
apparent that Soult & Bernadotte, who had taken Leipzig a few days before
had been reinforced by Davout and part of Murat’s cavalry corps.
The actual numbers on the field favoured the
Prussians by a good margin, but Brunswick feared that more French were on the
way, either through Leipzig or from Halle in his rear.
His first priority was to clear the path to
Eilenburg and secure a line of retreat to Torgau.
The French on the other hand were reluctant
to attack until reinforcements arrived.
As a result, there was only limited combat this day.
As it happened, the only French reinforcements to
arrive this day was Ney’s corps from Halle and that arrived too late to get
engaged.
So it could be argued that the
Prussians should have attacked the French while they had the advantage of
numbers, but it was a big battlefield and the Prussians had to march their army
down a single road across the front of the French so it took most of the day
before the Prussians were deployed facing the French.
Day 10
Both sides held their ground overnight.
The French stayed to fight as they had
approximate parity in numbers and reinforcements on the way.
The Prussians stayed to fight as they saw a slim
possibility of pulling off a last gasp campaign victory.
While
outnumbered in the campaign, they have almost every man of their army on this
field while much of the French are in the west, though no doubt marching this
way.
The Prussians also knew that their
cavalry superiority on the field should allow them to retreat should the battle
go badly.
At dawn the Prussians advanced on Bernadotte on
their left and Soult in their centre.
The first attack on Bernadotte went badly and it was soon apparent that
the French reinforcements were coming up much sooner than was hoped for.
The attack was called off and the battle
became a fighting withdrawal for the Prussians.
The superior Prussian cavalry covered the retreat and by noon the French
gave up the chase.
The Prussians lost a few more men in the 2 day
battle than the French, but the French losses were mainly in cavalry, the Prussian’s
in infantry.
The Prussians were able to withdraw to the fortress
of Torgau and safely cross the Elbe where they can wait for their Russian
allies to arrive.
The Battles
The campaign produced 4 battles, Gera, Leipzig,
Bittefeld & Eilenburg.
These are described in detail on blog posts of
2
nd Nov, 11
th Nov, 19
th Nov, 25
th
Nov & 2
nd Dec.
The
battles were fought using Hail Napoleon, our house ruled adaption of Hail
Caesar for the Napoleonic period.
The system
allows us to use 28mm, 15m or 6mm figures at different ground scales, so small
battles could be fought using 28mm figs, corps sized actions using 15mm fig and
large battles using 6mm figs.
Leipzig,
the smallest battle was fought using 15mm figures with a ground scale of 16”
per km.
The larger battles which had
about 100,000 men a side, were fought using 6mm figures with a ground scale of 8”
per km – making the table 15km x 9km.
Campaign Result
According to the campaign victory conditions the
French gained a minor victory.
However,
the Prussian players felt well pleased with them themselves for having done so
much better than the 1806 Prussians & thought the victory conditions were a
bit easier on the French than for them.
Outnumbered as they were, 175,000 to 140,000 it
was always going to be hard for the Prussians to force a battle on their terms and
win it decisively.
Their secondary objective of holding Leipzig until
day 12 was also a big ask.
Regardless of the result, all involved thoroughly enjoyed
the campaign.
Hidden movement and imperfectly
known details of the enemy add a completely new level to wargaming.
Such a system relies on an experienced and
skilful umpire and in this Peter did a grand job.